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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent; CARLA SWARTZ, Program Review Committee;  
 GREG JOHNSON, Program Review Committee; KERRI CROSS, Hearing Examiner;  
 OFFICER HARKLEROAD, C.O.1; LIEUTENANT WILLIAM SHRADER, C.O.3 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01717) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 16, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGARD, Circuit Judges 
 







                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Thurman Mearin appeals from a district court order granting Appellees’ 
motion for summary judgment.  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
I. 
 Mearin is a prisoner, acting pro se, who was formerly incarcerated at SCI – 
Greene.  He filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Appellees retaliated 
against him in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Mearin’s complaint 
alleged that Appellees retaliated against him for: (1) filing a grievance against a 
corrections officer and (2) giving a speech to prisoners about reporting ethnic 
intimidation.  Compl. ¶ 20.  Mearin further alleged that the retaliation was manifested by: 
(1) a threat from corrections officer Harkleroad; (2) the issuance of a misconduct by 
Harkleroad; (3) a showing of intimidation by corrections officer Shrader; (4) a finding of 
guilt for “encouraging group activity” by hearing officer Cross; and (5) the upholding of 
the finding of guilt by program review committee members Swartz and Johnson and 
Superintendent Folino.  Id. at ¶¶ 14-23. 
 Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that summary judgment should be granted to the defendants on all claims.  
Over Mearin’s Objections, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in 
its entirety and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  Mearin now 




 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary.  See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s order if an 
appeal presents no substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 This appeal presents no substantial questions.  The District Court correctly entered 
judgment in favor of Appellees on Mearin’s First Amendment claims.  The elements of a 
retaliation claim under § 1983 are: (1) engaging in a constitutionally protected activity, 
(2) suffering, at the hands of a state actor, an adverse action “sufficient to deter a person 
of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and (3) having the 
protected activity be a substantial motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take 
the adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  The third element, 
causation, means either: “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism 
coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007); see Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503-04 
(3d Cir. 1997).  In the absence of that proof, a plaintiff must show that from the 
“evidence gleaned from the record as a whole” the trier of fact should infer causation.  
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The first basis for Mearin’s retaliation claims is a grievance that he filed against a 
corrections officer (who is not a party to this action) for purportedly making a racial 
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threat to another inmate.  Mearin filed that grievance on August 15, 2013, nearly forty 
days prior to the alleged retaliatory acts of September 24, 2013, and after.  Notably, the 
alleged retaliatory acts came five days after the second purported basis, discussed below.  
The District Court correctly concluded that Mearin failed to advance any evidence that 
the August 15, 2013 grievance is in any way causally related to the alleged retaliatory 
acts.  See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated 
on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (in 
parallel Title VII context, noting that “the mere fact that adverse . . . action occurs after a 
complaint will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating 
a causal link between the two events” unless the timing is “unusually suggestive”).  In the 
absence of that, there is nothing in the record as a whole from which the Court can glean 
such a conclusion.  Summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate on this aspect of 
Mearin’s claims. 
 Mearin also makes several claims as to alleged retaliation for his speech to fellow 
inmates.  First, Mearin claims that corrections officer Harkleroad verbally threatened him 
with death for giving the speech.  In the “Concise Statement of Material Facts” 
accompanying their Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees asserted that Harkleroad 
did not threaten Mearin in any way.  Mearin did not specifically deny this alleged fact in 
his “Statement of Disputed Factual Issues,” and the Magistrate Judge deemed the fact 
admitted pursuant to local court rules.  This was an acceptable action.  Mearin is a 
talented pro se litigant who has made many filings of skill.  Even with the leniency due 
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pro se litigants, Mearin could expect to be held to the local rules surrounding summary 
judgment motion practice.  In his argument, Mearin claims the District Court ignored his 
other filings and committed error because Mearin had (a) generally disputed all factual 
issues, (b) was not informed by the court of the local rules, and (c) should have received 
more liberal construction of his pleadings.  None of these contentions is persuasive here. 
 Second, Mearin claims that corrections officer Harkleroad fabricated the 
misconduct that was issued related to his speech to inmates.  Our standard of review 
regarding disciplinary board decisions is highly deferential: “[T]he relevant question is 
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 
the disciplinary board.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).  Here, there 
was sworn testimony of a witness, Mr. Anderson, that during the inmate speech Mearin 
stated “[w]e need to stand up to these crackers,” referring to the SCI-Greene staff.  See 
Case No. 14-cv-01717, Docket No. 40-1, pp. 37-38.  Moreover, Mearin admitted, in 
written hearing documents, to advising others to “expose the cracker mind set” in the 
prison employees.  Id. at p. 35.  This constitutes at least some evidence that Mearin was 
guilty of “encouraging an unauthorized group activity” in the prison context.  Id.; see also 
Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that because the 
finding of guilt in the inmate’s disciplinary hearing was based on “some evidence,” that 
finding “essentially checkmates his retaliation claim”).  Given the undisputed summary 
judgment evidence, a reasonable finder of fact would have to conclude that the 
defendants would have made the same decision out of legitimate penological interests 
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regardless of Mearin’s protected conduct.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334; Carter v. 
McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2002). That forecloses Mearin’s retaliation claim 
based on the misconduct. 
 As to corrections officer Shrader, the Magistrate Judge correctly identified that 
Mearin’s only allegation is that he stood by and smiled while Harkleroad threatened 
Mearin.  The effect of the alleged conduct on the employee’s freedom of speech “need 
not be great in order to be actionable,” but it must be more than de minimis.  Suppan v. 
Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000).  We agree with the District Court that this 
alleged act cannot constitute an adverse action necessary to support a retaliation claim as 
it is insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights. 
 Cross is named in the complaint based solely on her role as the hearing officer 
who found Mearin guilty of the misconduct, but there is no allegation of retaliation made 
against her in regard to that decision.  The District Court thus acted properly in granting 
summary judgment on the claim related to her.  Finally, remaining are program review 
committee members Swartz and Johnson and Superintendent Folino, defendants in this 
action by virtue of having upheld the misconduct.  Mearin argues that these individuals 
should have come to his aid and resolved the misconduct in his favor, but, as the District 
Court correctly held, he advances no evidence of record to support a claim of retaliation 




 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants 
summary judgment on Mearin’s complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
